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 Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of current knowledge on the role and 
effectiveness of business incubation in supporting the development of new firms with high 
growth potential.  The quantitative and qualitative literature published by the academic and 
practitioner communities is reviewed. From analysis of this literature, the following 
conclusions are drawn: 
• In academic and practitioner publications alike there is widespread definitional and 
conceptual ambiguity in relation to business incubation. 
• Given the variety of business incubator strategies, business models, stakeholders, et 
al., there is no standard measure for assessing incubator performance.  The validity, 
comparability and generalisability of published findings of incubator performance need 
to be carefully considered. 
• As the incubation industry has matured so understanding of its core purpose has 
become more sophisticated.  
• Research on business incubation needs to be considered in the context of other bodies 
of knowledge; in particular cluster theory, regional innovation systems, 
entrepreneurship, investment, and firm growth.  
These conclusions point to areas of further research including the development of comparable 
performance indicators – not absolute performance measures – for business incubation; the 
need to integrate incubation research more effectively within established areas of research; 
the linking the activities of business incubation to new ventures in emerging industries; and 
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1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of current knowledge on the role and 
effectiveness of business incubation in supporting start-ups with high-growth potential.   
This paper draws upon the results of a project commissioned by the UK National Endowment 
for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA), the results of which have been published as Dee 
et al. (2011).  The purpose of the NESTA-funded research was to review research on models of 
incubation that have by various metrics the greatest impact on building high growth, 
innovative firms.   This paper also drew upon the interim results of – and contributes to – on-
going research on the role of the availability of finance for new firms in supporting the 
emergence of new industries1. 
For the purposes of this review, we use Hackett and Dilts’ definition of incubation as: 
 “[..] a shared office-space facility that seeks to provide its incubatees (i.e. ‘‘portfolio’’ 
or ‘‘client-’’ or ‘‘tenant-companies’’) with a strategic, value-adding intervention 
system (i.e. business incubation) of monitoring and business assistance.” (Hackett 
and Dilts, 2004:57).  
Within this definition, we also further refine our focus on to incubation activities that are 
primarily aimed at supporting new ventures seeking to create value from technology, and 
which have high growth potential. 
This paper reviews the results of quantitative and qualitative research on business incubation 
published by the academic and practitioner communities.  In order to address themes 
emerging from some of the publications reviewed, we widened our scope to make reference 
to the literature relating more broadly to the entrepreneurial process.   
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. First, we present the context of 
business incubation and give a typology of incubation types in order to provide structure for 
our review.  Second, we summarise and comment upon the literature relating to the 
performance of business incubation activities. Third, we focus our attention onto the literature 
relating to the strategies and operations of business incubation activities. Finally, we draw a 
series of conclusions from this analysis and recommend areas for further research.    
                                                          
1 In particular, the “Investment Frameworks” project within the EPSRC-funded Emerging Industries Programme at 




Since the first recognised incubator established in Batavia, New York in 19592, there was a 
slow diffusion of incubator programmes in the 1960s/70s followed by a strong increase in 
numbers through and beyond the 1990s (Figure 1).  Several factors drove this growth, and for 
technology-related incubation, three drivers for this include: 
• In the UK, the development of multiple public funding streams for ‘third mission’ 
activities (i.e. commercialisation activities beyond the core teaching and research 
missions) within universities stimulated a marked increase in new venture spin-off 
activities from the late 1990s onwards (Gill et al. 2007; Minshall 2008). Similarly in the 
US, the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act helped stimulate the increase in the number of university 
spin-outs and start-ups, and related support activities (Hackett and Dilts 2004b).  
• The emergence of the ‘new economy’ driven by the commercialisation of the Internet 
and development of the World Wide Web resulted in a dramatic increase in 
information and communication technology (ICT) related start-up activity (Nairn 2002) 
and in the provision of services to support the development of such ventures (Hansen 
et al. 2000).  
• The recognition by policymakers of the role that business incubation for technology 
start-ups could play in stimulating economic growth as one component within a 
regional innovation system.  In particular, the belief that incubation had the potential 
to support employment creation in the medium to long term was noted in policy 
documents (OECD 1997; UNIDO 1999). 
The establishment of industry associations such as the US National Business Incubation 
Association (NBIA3, established in 1984), the European Business Innovation Centre Network 
(EBN4, approved by the European Commission in 2002), and United Kingdom Business 
Incubation (UKBI5, established in 1998), led to increased interest in the assessment of the role 
and effectiveness of business incubation.  







Figure 1 Growth of the worldwide incubator industry (Barrow 2001) 
The focus of academic research in this area has evolved as the incubation industry itself has 
matured (Figure 2). While incubators lost some favour following the collapse of the dot.com 
speculative bubble in 2000 owing to the numerous commercially unsuccessful web business 
related incubators, incubation has nonetheless prevailed as part of a wider innovation system 
(Hackett and Dilts 2004b)6. 
 
Figure 2 Overview of incubator-incubation literature (Main topics in italics, research questions without italics) 
(Hackett and Dilts 2004b) 
                                                          
6  Dearlove (2001) provides a commentary on Internet incubators at the time of the collapse of the dot com bubble. 
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2.1 Objectives of incubation 
Two main rationales for incubation have emerged. The first view regards incubation as a way 
of addressing market failures which limit the ability of high-tech start-ups to overcome 
uncertainty and obstacles associated with the early stages of firm development (OECD 1997; 
Phan et al. 2005). Those who subscribe to the market failure view believe that failures stem 
from the relatively high costs and risks associated with providing support to high-tech start-up 
companies. Private sector institutions are unwilling to absorb the costs and risks if the 
potential to capture commercial value of the technology being exploited is too uncertain . The 
second view regards incubation as a catalyst to systematically accelerate the entrepreneurial 
process thereby institutionalising the support of ventures with potential for high growth 
(Hansen et al. 2000). In practice incubation has been associated with a variety of objectives 
(Allen and McCluskey 1990) (Table 1). Very often these objectives relate to the specific 
business environment (nationally and regionally) in which the incubator is located.  
Primary objective Secondary objective 
Real estate appreciation 
Sell proprietary services to tenant 
Job creation 
Positive statement of entrepreneurial potential 
Faculty-Industry collaboration 
Commercialise university research 
Capitalise investment opportunity 
 
Create opportunity for technology transfer 
Create investment opportunity 
Generate sustainable income for the organisation 
Diversify economic base 
Bolster tax base 
Complement existing programmes 
Utilise vacant facilities 
Strengthen service and instructional mission 
Capitalist investment opportunity 
Create good will between institution and 
community 
Product development 
Table 1 Incubation objectives (Allen and McCluskey 1990) 
Regardless of an incubator’s specified objective, its main lever with which to achieve its 
objective is through its impact upon its tenants or incubatees. The primary incubator function 
has been described as increasing the chances of an incubatee firm surviving its formative years 
(Allen and Rahman 1985). Theoretically the incubator can also impact on individual tenants 
through improving their growth paths, as illustrated in Figure 3. This impact can last beyond 
the incubation period. As a result incubation can fulfil many of the objectives described in 
Table 1 through enhancing growth in the productivity and employment of its tenants both 
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during and after the incubation process, which in turn has an impact on the wider business 
environment. 
 
Figure 3 Theoretical impact of an incubator on the irregular growth path of an individual tenant (Dee et al. 2011) 
2.2 Typologies of incubators 
The development of business incubation activities over the last 50 years has led to definitional 
and conceptual ambiguity regarding the scope and boundaries of the phenomenon (Lindelof 
and Lofsten 2002; Hackett and Dilts 2004b; Phan et al. 2005). Sources of definitional ambiguity 
include: 
• The disagreement about whether an incubator is a distinct organisation or a more 
general entrepreneurial environment (Swierczek 1992; Hackett and Dilts 2004b; Phan 
et al. 2005). 
• The emergence of virtual incubators (‘incubators without walls’) which focus on setting 
up a support infrastructure of business services to incubatees who are not located 
within a physical incubator building (Lalkaka 2001; Miller and Bound 2011)7. 
                                                          
7 There are mixed views on whether ‘virtual incubators’, i.e. ‘incubators without walls’, are incubators at all (Bearse 
1998 cited in Hackett and Dilts 2004). There has been a rise in a variety of ‘virtual incubators’ and acceleration 
programmes as incubator activities have diversified (Miller and Bound 2011). This study focuses on incubators with 
physical space. Anecdotally it has been suggested that physical space encourages more face-face interactions which 
build a greater level of trust than can be achieved online. This trust encourages more meaningful interactions and 
exchanges of knowledge and being part of the space increases the frequency of such interactions. How much 
‘virtual incubators’ are able to achieve such interactions and exchanges of knowledge between peers and others will 
depend on a case-by-case basis (Dee et al. 2011).  
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• The different types of stakeholders (i.e. publicly operated incubators vs. privately 
operated incubators) and their diverse goals (CSES 2002). 
• The distinction between incubators, venture capital firms and other start-up support 
structures (Aaboen 2009). 
• The lack of clarity on which part of the venture development progress is being 
considered (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005a; McAdam and McAdam 2008). 
In a generic sense the term ‘incubator’ is often used to describe a wide range of organisations 
that help entrepreneurs establish and develop their ideas from inception through to 
commercialisation and the start-up of a new enterprise (CSES 2002). A broad definition of the 
term includes science parks, technology centres, business and innovation centres, virtual 
incubators, business accelerators, venture accelerators and a variety of other models. In an 
attempt to provide some focus, Figure 4 gives an overview of different incubator models with 
regard to their business support and technology level.  
 
Figure 4 Typology of incubators (developed from ideas introduced in CSES (2002)) 
Besides the level of business support and technology, further distinction criteria for incubators 
can be classified with regard to whether they are (1) run for-profit or non-profit, (2) university 
related or non-university related, (3) stake holding or non-stake holding and (4) a physical or a 
virtual institution (see Figure 4). 
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Within the literature – and the industry - a variety of labels are often used in an 
interchangeable manner, which has led to problems in collecting and comparing data on 
incubators and has reduced the generalisability of research results (Hackett and Dilts 2004b). 
For the purpose of this research, the following definition of a business incubator from Hackett 
and Dilts is adopted: 
“[..] a shared office-space facility that seeks to provide its incubatees (i.e. 
‘‘portfolio-’’ or ‘‘client-’’ or ‘‘tenant-companies’’) with a strategic, value-adding 
intervention system (i.e. business incubation) of monitoring and business 
assistance. This system controls and links resources with the objective of 
facilitating the successful new venture development of the incubatees while 
simultaneously containing the cost of their potential failure” (Hackett and Dilts 
2004b:57) .  
Incubation has also been loosely applied to various activities at different units of analysis. 
Increasingly organisations involved with the support of entrepreneurial activity risk being 
referred to as ‘incubators’, with some extending the term to geographic regions with unusually 
levels of entrepreneurial activity (Phan et al. 2005). Some venture capitalists that offer higher 
than average business support activities have also been termed incubators, particularly in the 
U.S. This confusion among investors, professional services firms offering business support, and 
incubators has prompted some studies that seek to compare these differing roles (Hsu 2007; 
Aaboen 2009). We have drawn upon these studies and produced a top-line comparison 
between incubation, venture capital and professional services firms to identify specific 
characteristics of business incubation (Table 2). For example, though usually not as intensive as 
for venture capitalists, the implementation of a selection process for tenants seems important 
in incubation. In addition to business assistance, the aggregation and interaction of incubatees 
co-located inside the incubator has been identified as unique to incubation (Hackett and Dilts 
2004b). Table 2 supports this and suggests the distinctive features of incubation are a very 
mixed revenue stream, strong encouragement of peer to peer networking, addressing multiple 
needs of new ventures without prioritising just one, and offering continual exposure to the 
incubation environment and services. 
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 Venture capital Professional services firms Incubation 
Deal flow / 
clients 
Wide search processes, 
sometimes regional or 
industry specific. Before 
securing a client there is 
intensive due diligence 
Wide range of clients. 
Filtering based upon ability to 
pay. Often bid for projects 
Receive applications from 
ventures that are subject to a 
selection process e.g. 
incubator branding 
encourages self-selection or 
selection criteria is imposed 
on potential tenants 
Main revenue 
stream 
Returns on investment in 
ventures 
Billable hours Mixed revenue between 
rental income and other 




Need for equity finance to 
fund high growth 
Address a knowledge gap in 
clients 
Access to space, knowledge, 
resources, via staff, 
programmes and networks 
Peer to peer 
networking? 
Usually limited, though some 
funds do expressly promote 
Usually restricted Actively encouraged and 
facilitated through a shared 
space (typically physical space 
but also possible in an online 
space) 
Time scales Usually seek an exit 3-5 years 
after investment, but 
interaction with ventures is 
episodic 
Depends on a project by 
project basis, but typically 
months not years 
Typically 3-5 years (anchor 
tenants are often longer) with 
a mix of episodic and 
continuous interventions but 
continual exposure to 
incubation environment 
Target firms Typically addresses a 
narrower range of firms than 
incubators, and at a later 
stage 
Broader range of firms, not 
typically restricted to new 
ventures 
Typically addresses a broader 
range of firms than investors, 
and usually at an earlier stage 
than Venture Capitalists 
Table 2 Identifying the uniqueness of incubation (Developed from Hackett & Dilts (2004b); Aaboen (2009); Hsu 
(2007) 
3 Performance of business incubators 
There is no standard methodology for measuring incubator performance which makes 
comparisons between studies challenging8 (Phan et al. 2005). Analysis of published studies 
reveals that these need to be considered in terms of: 
• Author and publisher: While peer-reviewed academic publications should be 
considered reasonably free from bias, reports published by individual incubators or 
                                                          
8 Appendix A provides a tabular summary of different measures of business incubation observed in the literature. 
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industry associations may wish to present an overly positive view of incubator 
performance. 
• Research method: Three broad categories observed in our review are control group 
analysis, benchmarking, and in-depth analysis.  Each approach has strengths and 
weaknesses, and results from each are not typically comparable.  As with all research 
projects, large-scale surveys lead to quantitative date that may reveal broad trends, 
while case study analysis may provide richer, qualitative insight onto complex issues 
but may be less generalisable. 
• Focus of analysis: The focal areas in published analyses include performance outcomes 
(for the tenants, the incubator, or the region), management policies (such as selection 
processes and quality of management team), or the additional services offered the 
incubator (such as investment readiness programmes and access to business 
networks). 
In the following sections we review the literature in terms of each of these three broad 
themes. 
3.1 Author and publisher 
3.1.1 Data from incubator industry associations 
Business incubator industry associations regularly assess the impact of business incubators and 
offer estimates of aggregate performance (e.g. UKBI (2009), NBIA (Knopp 2007), EBN (2009)).  
Many incubators are either wholly or partly publicly funded. In the competition to attract 
public funds many incubators need regularly to demonstrate ‘success’ which can lead to over-
reporting successes and under-reporting failures especially when self-reporting (Hackett and 
Dilts 2004b).    
Job creation remains a popular measure used to evaluate incubator performance9 (CSES 2002; 
Frontline 2002; SQWConsulting 2008).  However, using job creation as a metric of incubator 
performance is problematic. New ventures will often try to reduce their fixed costs as they 
operate in conditions of uncertainty. Venture investors are acutely aware of the need to 
control spending by investee firms, which often means in practice delaying recruitment of full 
                                                          
9 While industry reports may have an optimistic view in promotion of their industries, data from the US show 
between 44-91 jobs created per year per incubator (Arena et al. 2008). Earlier reports from UNIDO and OECD were 
cautious in their endorsement for incubators as sustainable employment creators (OECD 1997; UNIDO 1999).  
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time employees (FTEs) as long as possible and instead preferring the use of flexible contract 
workers (Vanacker et al. 2011). This can lead to conflicting goals as incubators try to satisfy the 
needs of public bodies through supporting job creation, but also the needs of investors by 
discouraging incubatees taking on additional risk through recruiting FTEs. 
3.1.2 Quantitative academic studies 
Despite the growth in literature on incubation, few studies have applied a robust evaluative 
approach to assessing the economic contributions of incubators. Many quantitative academic 
studies attempting to evaluate the impact of incubators on populations of firms have more 
conservative results than industry studies, and often contradictory findings. Furthermore some 
of these studies include data on science parks as well as business incubators and this makes 
comparisons between studies challenging. For example an analysis of a longitudinal UK data 
set of on- and off-science park matched firms, including two surveys in 1986 and 1992, shows a 
higher survival rate among firms on parks with a Higher Education Institute (72%) than without 
(53%), insignificant difference between closure rates, and growth in employment concentrated 
in the hands of a few businesses while mean employment growth rates were similar (Siegel et 
al. 2003a). In our review of studies using more recent data sets, we found few contributions 
offering additional insights. Chen’s (2009) study of Taiwanese incubators found no direct effect 
on new venture performance as a result of incubation, whereas Rothaermel and Thursby 
(2005) showed incubated firms were significantly less likely to experience outright failure. 
Lindelof and Lofsten (2002) discovered no difference in profitability between on- and off-park 
firms, but off-park sample had significantly lower growth in employment and sales turnover. 
Making sense of such findings requires scrutiny of the research designs employed and their 
limitations (Appendix B). For example Rothaermel and Thursby (2005) used a single incubator 
study that is a useful exploratory contribution to incubation research but with limits to 
generalisability. 
This set of academic studies highlights the difficulty in answering what at first looks like a 
straightforward question – do incubators have a positive impact? As the outcomes of 
incubation may take many years to become apparent, as a company develops its markets and 
scales its production, how to discuss success varies from whether incubated ventures survive 
longer or have significant growth whilst being incubated. Many different approaches have 
been taken in significantly different time periods and contexts (Appendix A & B). Whist there 
are no highly negative outcomes, the positive outcomes are based around survival in the case 
of Rothaermel and Thursby (2005) or higher employment growth (Lindelof and Lofsten 2002). 
Aside from direct measures of success for incubated firms, the empirical evidence would 
 11 
suggest that incubatees who interact with the incubator (both in terms of other companies 
and support staff) have stronger learning (Scillitoe and Chakrabarti 2010), while incubators 
who screen against a balanced set of indicators  will have lower failure rates (Aerts et al. 2007).  
Taken together the studies are indicative of the approaches that may work, however given the 
relatively small number of studies and the lack of comparability between studies any 
conclusions should be treated as indicative at best.  
3.1.3 Policymakers 
Incubators are capable of extending their services beyond their community of incubatees, and 
incubatees extend their business beyond the walls of the incubator (OECD 1997; CSES 2002; 
Arena et al. 2008).  As such, incubators attract attention from policymakers seeking to support 
national, regional or local economic growth.   
When combined with a perspective of the incubation period generally being shorter than the 
life-cycle of a firm, the impact of an incubator on the wider business environment is likely to be 
greater than most measure recognises. While these business incubation effects can create 
considerable value in the wider business environment, they can be challenging to monitor. 
Wider impacts of business incubation beyond their direct affect on tenants include: 
• Incubation outreach: Incubators can extend their reach through assisting nascent 
entrepreneurs pre-incubation and supporting post-incubation entrepreneurs (Knopp 
2007).  UKBI recently estimated that 60% of incubators operate what they term as 
‘outreach’ services that support and advise companies outside the incubator (UKBI 
2009). 
• Indirect effects: Indirect effects include displacement of non-incubated firms with 
incubated firms, or additional jobs and wealth generation from supplying goods and 
services to incubator and tenants, or increased local spending from employee income 
of incubated firms (CSES 2002). A European study estimated a ratio of 1:1.5 for 
direct/indirect job creation from incubatees (CSES 2002). Another study suggests more 
conservative indirect effects with multipliers between 0.48 and 0.84 for the number of 
indirect jobs created from direct jobs from two incubators (Markley and McNamara 
1996). 
• Entrepreneurial learning: A proportion of incubatees will fail. Such new venture failure 
is often documented as the end of an entrepreneurial process, but it frequently 
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spawns other opportunities that entrepreneurs are in a better position to pursue after 
learning from failure (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005b):  
“If asked about the chief product of some of these firms, one might 
reply ‘entrepreneurs’” (Cooper, 1971 p.2 cited in Garnsey and 
Heffernan (2005b)) 
• Focal point: Given their intimate knowledge of the operational and strategic issues 
facing their tenants, incubator managers may be viewed by policymakers as an 
accessible and informed representative of a regional or local community of start-ups 
(Dee et al. 2011).    
3.2 Research methods 
When considering the impact of incubators on new venture performance the fundamental 
research question is ‘whether’ and ‘how’ incubators enhance the performance of high-tech 
start-ups. Many of the early studies seeking to answer these questions are primarily 
descriptive, lacking conceptual and/or methodological grounding (Campbell et al. 1985; Hisrich 
and Smilor 1988). More recently, studies show a stronger empirical focus, using data from 
surveys, interviews and case studies (Lindelof and Lofsten 2002; Siegel et al. 2003b; Dettwiler 
et al. 2006; Amezcua 2010). However, studies on incubator impacts are fragmented and do not 
feed into a consistent stream of research. Definitional ambiguity about incubators and other 
SME supporting structures, the diverse range of different incubator models and the lack of 
consensus on appropriate performance measures have led to different directions of research 
and limited generalisability of the findings.    
Research methodologies used to assess the impact of incubators on new venture performance 
can be divided into (1) studies that compare firms on and off incubators (control group 
concept), (2) studies that follow a comparative evaluation approach (benchmarking) and (3) 
studies that focus on an in-depth investigation of certain tenants, incubators or regions (in-
depth studies).   
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Approach Methods Examples 
Control-group 
concept 
Pairing firms, on and off site (Lindelof and Lofsten 2002; Siegel et al. 2003b; Dettwiler 
et al. 2006; Amezcua 2010) 
Benchmarking Surveys, categorisation, 
interviews, self-reporting 
(CSES 2002; Knopp 2007; UKBI 2009)10 
In-depth studies Surveys, case studies (Grimaldi and Grandi 2005; Bergek and Norrman 2008; 
Patton et al. 2009) 
Table 3 Review of research methodologies used to assess incubator performance 
3.2.1 Control group concept: comparing firms on and off science parks 
The control group concept is based on a comparison between a sample of high-tech firms 
located in technology incubators and a control sample of off-incubator firms along a series of 
performance dimensions. Examples of such research include Westhead (1997), Colombo and 
Delmastro (2002), Lindelof and Lofsten (2002), Siegel et al. (2003), Dettwiler et al. (2006) and 
Amezcua (2010).  However, the results of such studies are limited to application to incubators 
for the following reasons:  
• Control group studies underlie a strong selection bias making it difficult to distinguish 
to what extent a tenant company’s success can be attributed to incubators services or 
to the selection process of the incubator11.  
• Many of the studies focus on science parks whose tenants may be more physically 
dispersed and as such the researchers are actually observing the impact of a wider 
regional factors on new venture performance.  
• The performance measures used (e.g. revenue growth, employment growth, survival 
rate etc.) have their limitations with regard to assessing success of young ventures.  
                                                          
10 While these studies attempt to benchmark incubator performance, their main methodology is an in situ 
assessment. 
11 Bearse (1998) draws a comparison between selecting incubatees and selecting students for admission to Harvard 
University. Specifically he asks whether Harvard students (the incubatees) succeed because of what Harvard (the 
incubator) does to them, or because Harvard selects only students who will succeed regardless of what Harvard 
does to them (Bearse 1998).  
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3.2.2 Benchmarking 
Benchmarking studies follow a comparative evaluation approach, analysing comparative 
characteristics and metrics of different incubator programmes with similar core objectives and 
relate the performance outcomes to the activities of the incubator in order to identify best 
practice. Examples of studies that sought to develop benchmarking frameworks include 
Campbell et al. (1985), Smilor and Gill (1987), Hisrich and Smilor (1988) and Allen and 
McCluskey (1990).  More recent works that have sought to provide varying emphases on 
different components of the incubator model include Hackett and Dilts (2004) and Bergek and 
Norrman (2008). 
The most comprehensive benchmarking efforts are often those produced by industry 
associations. See, for example, UKBI (2009), NBIA (Knopp 2007), EBN (2009). 
Benchmarking studies indicate that the incubator concept seems to provide a nurturing 
environment for the development of technology start-ups. However, most benchmark studies 
treat incubators as a ‘black box’ focusing mainly on outcome (e.g. survival rate, revenue 
growth rate, jobs created), which does not itself explain how and why some incubators appear 
to perform better than others. As a consequence most studies lack a detailed characterization 
of the value adding components of the incubation process.    
Furthermore, organisations such as the NBIA, EBN or UKBI represent a diverse range of 
different incubator models with different modus operandi and goals. This makes a benchmark 
analysis challenging, as the identification of best practice requires distinguishing between 
different incubator models and measuring their outcomes in relation to their goals 
(Mosselman et al. 2004). The failure to take goals into account is problematic in two ways: First 
it follows from the definition of performance that comparisons should only be made between 
incubators that have the same goals. Secondly, if approaches fail to control for differences in 
incubator goals or take into account different goals at the same time, it is hard to tell whether 
differences in outcomes are the result of differences in incubator practices or merely due to 
differences in foci between incubators (Bergek and Norrman 2008). However, most industry 
reports fail to take into account different goals and different corresponding performance 
measures – instead they benchmark on an aggregated level and extrapolate their general 
incubator analysis to other incubator models.  
A further problem of benchmarking studies is that measuring the performance of an incubator 
implicitly includes a measurement of the performance of the whole region surrounding the 
incubator. An incubator located in a region with high entrepreneurial activity and 
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infrastructure like Silicon Valley or Cambridge (UK) might outperform an incubator located in a 
remote location that does not enjoy the same favourable environmental conditions for 
entrepreneurship. Most benchmarking studies do not account for regional differences, thus 
making it challenging to distinguish the performance of the incubator institution itself from the 
performance of the surrounding ecosystem. 
Finally, benchmarking studies underlie the same selection bias and limitations of performance 
measures as discussed earlier in context with control group studies.   
3.2.3 In-depth investigation approaches 
In-depth studies of incubator impacts focus on detailed investigation of a certain aspect of 
incubation through surveys or case studies on a selected sample of incubators or incubatees. 
In contrast to the control group concept and benchmarking approaches, in-depth studies often 
take an internal perspective to investigate the research question. Thus, the focus of these 
studies lies on the incubator or incubatee level.  Examples of in-depth studies include Mian 
(1996), Rice (2002) and Bollingtoft and Ulhoi (2005). 
In-depth studies provide important insights into the ‘mechanisms’ of incubator support and 
thus help to understand ‘how’ the incubator model works. A problem of in-depth approaches 
is that most studies focus on start-ups in general without making a distinction between 
different stages of development. However, start-ups may face different challenges and needs 
at different stages of their founding process. Furthermore, most approaches look at incubators 
as a self-sustaining entity without considering other coexisting start-up support structures such 
as business angels and VCs and their simultaneous impact on new venture performance.   
3.2.4 Burden of data capture 
While monitoring incubator activity is generally considered useful by incubators and their 
stakeholders, it can also become cumbersome and erode the ability of the incubator to 
perform to its maximum capacity. One study identified that incubator managers were ‘less 
effective’ when distracted from their core activities by excess monitoring or the need to secure 
funds for the business incubator (Rice 2002). The 2006 NBIA survey team believe the length of 
the survey12 was to blame for their lowest response rate since their surveys began. 
An alternative approach was taken by the Swedish VINNKUBATOR programme (now 
InnovationsBron13) where they asked Fokus Analysis to develop an online assessment tool in 
                                                          
12 The survey included 31 multi-part questions requiring over 200 answers. 
13 Information on the Fokus Analysis at www.innovationsbron.se   
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collaboration with incubators. The tool was to be of use to incubators for monitoring their own 
performance, but also enabled a centralised collection of data for review by public bodies. This 
approach seems to have been well received, and data is regularly collected. Nonetheless 
surveys and monitoring are very unlikely to measure all activities or outputs of business 
incubators, and attempts to do so would likely be cumbersome and time consuming.  
3.3 Focus of analysis 
Approaches to measure the performance of incubators can use either direct or indirect 
measures and most often focus on one of the following three categories: (1) performance 
outcomes, (2) management policies and their effectiveness and (3) incubator services and their 
value added. 
3.3.1 Performance outcomes 
Performance outcomes are normally assessed by using direct measures related to the tenant 
firm’s performance, the incubator programme’s growth and sustainability, or measures related 
to university and the local community.   
A popular measure associated with the tenant company’s performance used by academic 
studies and industry reports is survival (Smilor 1987; Allen and McCluskey 1990; Mian 1997; 
Hackett and Dilts 2004b; Knopp 2007; UKBI 2009; Amezcua 2010). Survival is either measured 
as: 
• the ratio of firms that are still in business when graduating from the incubator/total 
number of firms started in the incubator; or 
• the ratio of the number firms exiting the incubator/number of firms discontinuing 
operations.  
However, using survival as the sole measure of incubator outcomes has limited utility as 
incubators may also be designed to maximise firm and cluster outcomes other than the 
longevity of individual incubatees (Phan et al. 2005). Furthermore survival alone says little 
about company performance (e.g. whether the company is growing and whether it is 
profitable) or in other words, whether the incubator serves as an efficient accelerator or an 
inefficient life support system.   
Other widely adopted measures associated with the tenant company’s performance are the 
firm’s sales growth (Mian 1997; Lindelof and Lofsten 2002; Dettwiler et al. 2006; Chen 2009; 
Amezcua 2010), profit growth (Mian 1997; Lindelof and Lofsten 2002; Dettwiler et al. 2006; 
 17 
Chen 2009) or employment growth (Udell 1990; Mian 1997; Lindelof and Lofsten 2002; 
Dettwiler et al. 2006; Amezcua 2010).  While these measures are popular and widely accepted 
for assessing established firms, it is questionable to which extent they are applicable to assess 
start-up performance. Technology start-ups follow irregular growth paths (Garnsey and 
Heffernan 2005a), most often do not create any revenue in the first years and take a long time 
to break-even.  A longer term perspective including post graduation performance would be 
required to assess the performance of former tenant companies.  
Popular performance measures addressing the incubator programme’s growth and 
sustainability are the incubator occupancy rate (Allen and McCluskey 1990), graduation rate14 
(Udell 1990; Mian 1997; CSES 2002) or new firms created per year (Udell 1990). However, the 
value of these measures in assessing incubator performance also seems to have its limitations. 
For example, a 100% occupancy rate is not necessarily ideal since a key issue for an incubator 
should be to have enough flexibility to enable tenants to progress from one type of 
accommodation to another as they grow. Thus an occupation rate of 85% could imply better 
performance than an occupation rate of 100%. 
3.3.2 Management policies and their effectiveness 
Approaches measuring the management policies and their effectiveness include an assessment 
of the incubator’s managing practices and operational policies in light of the programme 
objectives. The success of the programme is assumed to depend upon the effective utilisation 
of resources (Sherman and Chappell 1998). Key performance indicators include whether the 
incubator has a distinct selection process in place (Kuratko  and LaFollette 1987; Merrifield 
1987; Bergek and Norrman 2008), the quality and support of the management team in place 
(Rice 2002), or the extent of realisation of the stated goals (Mian 1997).  
3.3.3 Incubator services and their value added  
Approaches to measure the performance through the incubator services and their value added 
focus on a review of the actual provision and their perceived value added to the tenant 
companies. Typical services considered include flexible office space and shared office services 
(Allen and Rahman 1985; Hisrich and Smilor 1988; Mian 1997; Rice 2002; Dettwiler et al. 
2006), business assistance (Mian 1996; Rice 2002; Bergek and Norrman 2008), or provision to 
                                                          
14 The number of total graduates to date divided by the number of years of operation gives the average firm 
incubation [many incubators don’t create new firms but take them on shortly after start-up] rate per year. This rate 
is further multiplied by 100 and divided by the number of tenants give the average percentage of tenants graduate 
per year defined here as the graduation rate (Mian 1997). 
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access networks (Smilor 1987; Mian 1996; Hansen et al. 2000; Rice 2002; Dettwiler et al. 
2006). 
3.4 Criticisms and limitations of performance measures 
As the previous discussion shows, direct measures, such as survival, revenue growth, profit 
growth or occupancy rate have their limitations and do not seem to be useful in assessing the 
performance of incubators or incubatees.  Nevertheless, they are frequently used in many 
academic studies and as key performance indicators by practitioners. 
Definitional ambiguity has further led to problems collecting and comparing data on 
incubators and has reduced the generalisability of theoretical contributions. Many incubators 
have mixed revenue sources and depend on a variety of different stakeholders. Thus it is 
difficult to define a standard measure to assess incubator performance.  
Furthermore many studies survey incubator managers as a central contact. However, 
incubator managers do not necessarily represent the views of the incubatees. Financial 
dependency may force incubator managers to demonstrate on-going success in order to justify 
continued subsidization. This might tempt incubator managers to overate success and 
underreport failures, thus negatively affecting the quality of data on incubator performance 
(Hackett and Dilts 2004b).    
One approach to performance measurement that seeks to offer a more robust assessment of 
incubator value-add is that of real options (Hackett and Dilts 2004).  A real options approach, 
originally used in corporate finance, applies option valuation techniques to capital budgeting 
decisions, so creating options for when to make, abandon, expand or contract a capital 
investment15. Five options are described under ‘initial outcomes’ (Table 3). That practice is 
less pure than theory is implicitly acknowledged by Hackett and Dilts (2004a): 
“However, facilitating the survival of incubatees or containing the cost of failure of the 
options to the sunk cost of creating the option minus any remaining option value, and 
                                                          
15 The real option approach “[..] is based on the logic of financial options in that financial options are contracts that 
create valuable flexibility; if you have a financial option, you have the flexibility to purchase, or sell, something at a 
pre-specified price at a later date, or to go with the market price at that future date.  Like financial options, 
investments in real assets can provide firms the option to take an action at a later date if conditions are favourable, 




reporting these successes, can result in the renewal of annual operating subsidies, a 
very important upside without which many incubators would close.” (Ibid. p51, 
emphasis added)  
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 Table 4  Real options framework (Hackett and Dilts 2004a) 
Real options theory can provide an additional theoretical insight into incubation practice. 
However, since incubatee options cannot be priced accurately until they are realised or expire 
(too many uncertainties prevail for accurate quantification), options theory is insightful rather 
than universally true. In relation to the use of real options for assessing incubator 
performance, an interview with one incubator manager reported in Dee et al. (2011) revealed 
the following observations: 
• Most subsidy-providers would not operate within the options framework and would 
instinctively prefer an option 3 to an option 4 outcome (Table 3).  
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• Option theory does not take fully into account the potentially elastic timescales 
involved where incubation is concerned. The best ideas of tenants can be the ones 
that grow out of their original proposal and which need to go through numerous 
iterations before becoming a ‘killer app’.  
• Another fundamental difference between the VC option model (relatively purist) and 
the incubator option model (much more pragmatic) is that VC funds have partners or 
shareholders, whereas incubators usually have multiple stakeholders.  The VC's 
success is ultimately dependent on selling its cashed-in options for many multiples of 
the original option price, and wise VCs spend as little time as possible on the ‘living 
dead’.  A shrewd incubator manager will team and ladle different sources of income to 
cross-subsidize different activities, something pure real-options theory does not allow 
for. This is legitimate in terms of fulfilling a mandate of supporting growth firms 
because of the high degree of uncertainty involved in taking on a new client. 
• 'Selection' takes place at multiple intervals during (also before and after) the 
relationship and not just up front. Selection is not just about dealing with existing 
tenants either, it also involves long-term relationships with individuals who move out 
but may move back in, their advisers and investors – something very hard to put a 
price on, and so value as an option.  
• The implication for policy purposes is not that all incubators should be run as short-
term accelerators rewarded with equity ‘kickers’ like a VC, but that subsidy providers 
would benefit from being more sophisticated in measuring success and less reliant on 
proxy measures such as numbers of jobs created in a short space of time (Dee et al. 
2011: 20-21). 
4 How incubators influence outcomes in new venture performance 
Research on the methods by which incubators can support the development of high-
technology start-ups needs to be considered in the context of the literature on the 
entrepreneurial processes of high technology start-ups. 
4.1 Understanding of the entrepreneurial process 
Garnsey et al. (2006) draw upon a wide review of literature and empirical evidence to develop 
a conceptual model for describing the entrepreneurial process of new, technology-based firms 
(Figure 6). This helps elucidate the ways an incubator could influence the trajectory of firm 
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development. Every firm customises the model taking account of its own resource base and 
perceived opportunities. New firms tend to be more focused on business ideas and gaining the 
resources needed to build a productive and commercial base, while more established firms 
focus on value creation and capture. Incubation can impact various aspects of the 
entrepreneurial process, from strategic input to the business model, to modifying or 
accelerating the entrepreneurial process through access to resource providers, entrepreneurial 
learning from peers, access to customers, advice on intellectual property rights to improve 
value capture, etc.  
 
Figure 5:  The entrepreneurial process (Garnsey et al. 2006) 
The entrepreneurship literature reveals numerous additional factors that impact upon the 
manner by which incubators support the development of high technology start-ups.  Such 
factors include the following: 
• Firms with high growth episodes are disproportionately important to the emergence of 
industries, job creation and economic wealth (Acs et al. 2008; Garnsey and Mohr 2010)  
• High growth firms are a small percentage of all new enterprises, but face distinctive 
problems (Anyadike-Danes et al. 2009) 
• Firms rarely experience continuous growth, discontinuous high growth episodes are 
more common (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005a) 
• High growth episodes usually result from a combination of internal firm factors and 
external factors in the business environment (Penrose 1959) 
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• Opportunities for ‘high growth’ are typically associated with uncertainty, as obvious 
opportunities for all leads to rapid exploitation that reduces the scope for 
‘entrepreneurial rents’ (Perez 2004).  
For incubators seeking to support high growth potential, high technology start-ups, these 
factors underpin and inform the selection of an appropriate strategy, and the design of its 
operations. 
4.2 The strategy and operations of business incubation 
In addition to the factors highlighted in the previous section, the selection of an appropriate 
strategy and associated configuration of operations for an incubator needs to be considered in 
terms of fit with its stakeholder aspirations, the geographic location of the incubator, the 
characteristics of its potential or actual incubatees, and the stage of evolution of the incubator 
itself.  
An incubator will typically have a wide range of stakeholders, which may include multiple 
shareholders, and frequently multiple funders (CSES 2002).  All of these may demand, to 
differing degrees, input to the design of strategy of the incubator and associated key 
performance indicators. 
The location of an incubator is likely to have a profound influence on the choice of strategy 
and its successful implementation.  Location can be considered in terms of absolute location 
(where the incubator is), relative location (what it is near) and cognitive distance (how 
integrated it is with its regional innovation system) (Asheim and Gertler 2005; Moodysson et 
al. 2006; Huggins 2008).  Consideration also needs to be given to the characteristics of the 
regional innovation system and what this may mean in terms of availability of accessible 
resources (Asheim and Gertler 2005).   
Within the literature on regional innovation systems, universities are often highlighted as 
influencing many aspects of innovation activities, including support for new and growing 
ventures (Saxenian 1987; Asheim and Gertler 2005; Walshok et al. 2010).  The literature makes 
connections between presence of universities and the activities of proximate incubators but 
notes proximity to a university alone is unlikely to deliver value (Rothschild and Darr 2005; 
Ratinho and Henriques 2010).  Universities and other research institutions may be able to offer 
incubatees access to advanced technology laboratories, equipment and other research and 
technical resources, but also offer access to ‘talent’ such as faculty, staff and students (Phillips 
2002; Hackett and Dilts 2004b; Koh et al. 2005; Phan et al. 2005). However the accessibility of 
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university resources is likely to be influenced by the entrepreneurial orientation and support 
structures of the university and region (Clarysse et al. 2005).  
Even within a region with a mature regional innovation system it can take time for incubators 
to become embedded in the local business environment. Once built the incubator aims to 
achieve high occupancy and stable demand for space, finally reaching a stage of more demand 
for space than it can service and becoming a centre of entrepreneurial gravity in the 
community (Allen 1988; Hackett and Dilts 2004b; Aaboen 2009) (Figure 7). Initially a young 
incubator is more likely to suffer from insufficient demand for its services and it may fail to 
reach a critical mass of its target clients (Tamasy 2007). As an incubator becomes more 
embedded and known, the recruitment of new tenants should become easier and with more 
potential tenants to choose from the more selective the incubator can be (Aaboen 2009). As 
an incubator develops it builds knowledge and networks that increasingly meet the needs of 
their tenants in combination with the resources and opportunities associated with the local 
business environment. This can lead to increasing specialisation by the incubator (Aaboen 
2009). 
The characteristics of actual or potential tenants also influence the choice of incubation 
strategy. An incubator may choose to focus on a specific niche or be more generalist.  Niche 
incubators can be seen in sectors such as renewable energy16 and biotechnology17.  The choice 
of niche will dictate what resources and services need to be provided, and the type of physical 
infrastructure provided. If the target niche requires a specific physical layout of buildings, and 
access to specialist capital equipment, this is likely to reduce the ability of the incubator to 
make significant changes in strategic direction in response to changing conditions and require 
potentially higher initial investment. In contrast, targeting potential incubatees from the 
consumer Internet and mobile applications sectors would result in the incubator needing only 
to provide more general-purpose office space and little need for capital intensive, fixed 
purpose infrastructure (Miller and Bound 2011). 
                                                          
16 This niche has a dedicated incubator industry association in the US:  http://www.cleanenergyalliance.com. 
17 Examples in the UK include: www.ipi.ac.uk/incubator, www.biocity.co.uk and www.babraham.com. 
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Figure 6 Life cycle of incubator (adapted from Aaboen 2009) 
4.2.1 Physical resources 
The incubator building and facilities can themselves be valued by entrepreneurs, especially if 
designed for business incubation (UKBI 2009). Shared facilities enable incubatees to use 
professional facilities (e.g. meeting rooms, reception, ICT etc.) without the burden of being 
wholly responsible for their cost. Incubation space can also be designed to encourage peer-to-
peer networking through the provision of communal spaces, such as common rooms and 
canteens, located in visible and accessible areas. Early studies of incubation emphasised 
facilities and administrative services, with more recent contributions emphasising the 
importance of business support and networks (Hansen et al. 2000; Hackett and Dilts 2004b).  
4.2.2 Service provision 
The incubator delivers services and provides access to resources and networks typically via its 
own incubator staff and external consultants. Typical incubator services and resources reflect 
the needs of the entrepreneurial process (as shown earlier in Figure 6). For example strategic 
input to the business model, access to resources including capital, organisational and 
recruitment support to build the productive and commercial base, access to technical facilities, 
advice on capturing value from innovation through intellectual property rights, and so on 
(Mian 1996; Hackett and Dilts 2004b; Grimaldi and Grandi 2005; Patton et al. 2009). These 
services can be delivered in varying degrees of quality, quantity and intensity (Rice 2002).  
In addition to direct counselling and business services delivered through the incubator, the 
incubator often acts as a mediator between the entrepreneur and other resources and 
networks. It has been suggested that ‘better incubators’ offer an extensive network of 
powerful business connections that can be transformative to the development of its tenants 
(Hansen et al. 2000). If an incubatee lacks its own, then access to relevant entrepreneurial 
networks can be highly valued (Bergek and Norrman 2008). When firms lack credibility the role 
of a mediator to provide access to networks can be invaluable. It is suggested that as firms 
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become more established their networks become more calculated to fit the increased quantity 
and scope of resource needs (Hite and Hesterly 2001). The incubator can also offer 
institutional mediation e.g. for access to public grants and programmes (Bergek and Norrman 
2008).  
The characteristics of the tenants and their associated needs influence the choice of services 
that an incubator offers.  For example, tenants will have different needs depending on their 
industry sector (Dee et al. 2008; EBN 2009; Garnsey and Mohr 2010). Their requirements will 
also differ depending on their prior entrepreneurial experience (Lacher and Minshall In 
review)18.  
Tenants seem to become dissatisfied with incubator support when the incubators programme 
is predetermined rather than re-evaluated depending on changing needs (Ratinho and 
Henriques 2010)19.  A prescriptive strategy enforced through rigid monitoring can erode the 
ability to apply lessons learnt and adapt to changing conditions (Teece et al. 1997).  A critical 
function of incubators seems to be the ability to learn and adapt to the changing needs of their 
tenants: 
“It is important for us to stress the usefulness of a variety of different 
incubators adhering to different incubating models, whose rationale lies 
behind the existence of companies with different business models and with 
different requirements” (Grimaldi and Grandi 2005:119). 
4.2.3 Intangible benefits 
Customers and suppliers can be wary of dealing with new ventures that are perceived to lack 
credibility and legitimacy (Bhidé 2000). The incubator can lend these through association with 
the venture (EBN 2009; UKBI 2009).  Even the incubator’s address can be a benefit: just under 
80% of respondents in a UKBI survey highlighted the fact that their business was located at a 
recognised, commercial address was perceived as valuable (UKBI 2009).  
                                                          
18 Although based on an in-depth analysis of the tenants from a single incubator, Lacher and Minshall (2011) 
showed that companies without start-up experience sought support with functional skills e.g. marketing, IT, legal 
and government regulations in addition to market and opportunity understanding. Companies with start-up 
experience sought support in strategic information e.g. market and opportunities, customers, PR in addition to 
access to related R&D activity. 
19 Ratinho and Henriques (2010) observe tenant dissatisfaction with Madeira Tecnopolo incubation programme. 
Companies are admitted after winning an award that entitles them to a year’s business incubation services, but the 
services are rigid and often inappropriate for the firms. In the same study the Sogist Incubator was criticised for 
locking tenants into a 1 year lease which reverted to shareholding capital on the agreement of both parties. 
Successful companies did not agree to this while unsuccessful tenants needed an increase in capital. As a result 
Sogist has not acquired any shares. (Ratinho and Henriques 2010) 
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4.2.4 Selection processes 
Rather than cater to all types of firms, business incubators typically introduce a selection 
process to target a particular group of firms. There seems to be agreement among researchers 
that selection is an important incubator management task (Hackett and Dilts 2004b; Bergek 
and Norrman 2008). In Europe 97% of incubators use a set of screening factors to evaluate 
potential tenants (Aerts et al. 2007). Implementing appropriate selection processes for entry 
into an incubator enables a better ‘fit’ between the services it provides and the needs of 
tenants. It is a task subject to errors owing to the challenge of distinguishing between the 
potential of entrepreneurs operating with different types of uncertainty (e.g. technological, 
market, regulatory etc.). It has been argued that this is reason enough to let as many 
entrepreneurs try as is reasonably possible since ‘important qualities, for instance if the person 
is coachable, are not possible to fully detect at a screening meeting’ (Aaboen 2009 p.661). 
Selection processes can be broadly split into those focused mainly on the idea or those focused 
primarily on the entrepreneur or team (Bergek and Norrman 2008) (Table 5). Another study 
exploring the link between screening practices and incubator performance suggests a 
significantly positive relationship between tenant failure and the S-index i.e. a high 
concentration on one screening dimension (financial factors, team or market) (Aerts et al. 
2007). This implies screening processes should include a variety of factors. An alternative 
approach is for an incubator to carefully position their brand to enable ventures to self-select if 
they think the facilities and services are matched to their needs. As with a venture capital 
investor, incubators need ‘deal flow’. A selection process can only be imposed if the business 
incubator can afford to turn away potential tenants (Dee et al. 2011).  
Selection strategies Survival of the fittest Picking the winners 
Idea-focused 
selection 
The portfolio will presumably consist of a 
quite large number of idea owners (or 
upcoming entrepreneurs) with immature 
ideas related to a broad spectrum of 
fields. 
Results in a highly ‘niched’ portfolio of 
thoroughly screened ideas within a quite 
narrow technological area – often sprung 




The resulting portfolio will be diversified, 
and consist of entrepreneurs/teams with 
strong driving forces representing a broad 
set of ventures. 
The portfolio consists of a few handpicked 
and carefully evaluated entrepreneurs, 
commonly with ideas coupled to the 
research areas of a nearby university. 
Table 5  Selection strategies (Bergek and Norrman 2008:24)  
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Out of the incubators studied by Bergek and Norrman (16 Swedish VINNKUBATOR incubators) 
six were focused on the entrepreneur, seven on the idea with three having equal emphasis on 
both. Most had an emphasis on ‘picking the winners’ but also had pre-incubation processes 
with a qualification process of ideas. Only one had a survival-of-the-fittest approach where 
around 40% of candidates were accepted, though this incubator also had a significantly higher 
number of incubatees. Other incubators had a rejection rate of around 80% (Bergek and 
Norrman 2008). 
4.2.5 Incubation business models 
There are four main sources of revenue for business incubators: rent from tenants, fees from 
providing business support services to tenants and others, sharing in client successes through 
equity or royalty agreements, and sponsorship from public or private sources (Knopp 2007; 
EBN 2009). Most incubators have mixed income from a variety of sources (Figure 7), which can 
cause ‘principal-agent’ problems20. In the U.S. anchor tenants (businesses that do not receive 
incubation services but remain in the incubator facility) can provide a stable revenue stream 
and experienced mentors (Knopp 2007).  
 
Figure 7  Sources of income reported by EBM members (EBN 2009) 
Generating revenue from services when clients are resource constrained is often not 
sustainable without subsidies from public bodies. This impacts value capture from renting 
space and supplying business support services. Capturing value through taking equity in clients 
                                                          
20 A concept from Agency Theory where two parties (an Agent and a Principal) may have divergent goals and where 
information may be asymmetric. 
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introduces delays in revenue, and can cause the incubator to behave more like an equity 
investor by prioritising short term financial returns rather than longer term performance (Hsu 
2007; Dee and Minshall 2011). However, the alternative of relying on mixed income from 
public and private sectors can also lead to ‘principal-agent’ problems as incubators try to 
respond to multiple and often incompatible objectives while still staying faithful to the wider 
imperative of supporting high-potential firms. For instance, public programmes may target job 
creation while private investors generally seek to delay employment growth as long as possible 
because higher payroll costs increase cash bur significantly – and most incubatees are cash-
constrained. 
The literature gives little insight on whether business incubators could generate better returns 
for early stage investments than other kinds of investors. Early stage investments typically 
have poor returns compared to other types of equity investment, and European internal rates 
of return are lower than in the U.S. (BVCA 2009). In the U.S. nearly half (46%) of technology 
incubators reported taking equity in some or all of their tenants (23% in all clients, 23% in 
selected ones). In these incubators investors are usually an integral part of operations (Knopp 
2007). On closer scrutiny of the ‘incubators’ identified by organisations like the NBIA, some 
have also been referred to as ‘investors’ and are motivated by financial returns on investment. 
These types of equity investments are likely to face similar problems as other early stage 
investments (Gill et al. 2007; Dee and Minshall 2011). 
Corporate funded incubators can reduce the reliance on a mixed revenue stream, but will 
require incubatees that fit with the goals of the corporation. These incubators tend to have 
particular goals such as providing an environment for the nurture of ideas unable to thrive 
within the corporate environment, or to attract in new ideas from outside the corporate (Ford 
and Probert 2009; Ford et al. 2010). Strategic alignment with the corporate is often critical, as 
is separating corporate decision making from incubator decision-making. 




Figure 8 Illustration of key variables in the business models of business incubators (See Appendix C) 
5 Conclusions and implications for further research 
This paper has sought to review current knowledge relating to business incubation for high-
tech start-ups.  The paper has explored the business incubation research in terms of context 
(attempting to clarify objectives and provide a useable typology), the measurement of 
performance of incubators, and the strategies and operations via which the incubators support 
their incubatees.  From this review, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
• In academic and practitioner publications alike there is widespread definitional and 
conceptual ambiguity in relation to business incubation.  This is in part due to 
insufficient effort being placed by both researchers and practitioners on crafting 
precise definitions.  However, it is also a result of the maturation of the incubator 
industry and the resultant proliferation of diverse models of business incubation. 
• Given the variety of business incubator strategies, business models, stakeholders, et 
al., there is no standard measure for assessing incubator performance.  The validity, 
comparability and generalisability of published findings of incubator performance need 
to be carefully considered in terms of the authorship, research method, and focus of 
analysis. 
• As the incubation industry has matured so understanding of its core purpose has 
become more sophisticated. If in 1985 “the universal purpose of an incubator [was] to 
increase the chances of an incubatee firm surviving its formative years” (Allen and 
Rahman 1985) a decade on the definition recognised the need to add value: “we 
define business incubator as a shared office space facility that seeks to provide its 
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incubatees […] with a strategic, value-adding intervention system of monitoring and 
business assistance” (Hackett and Dilts 2004b). 
• Research on business incubation needs to be considered in the context of other bodies 
of knowledge; in particular cluster theory, regional innovation systems, 
entrepreneurship, investment, and firm growth. Considering incubation in isolation 
risks drawing simplistic conclusions and leads to inappropriate policy and management 
recommendations. 
These conclusions point to the following areas where further research is needed: 
• Research is needed to develop a robust, operationalisable, set of comparable 
performance indicators – not absolute performance measures – for business 
incubation. 
• The literature on business incubation needs to be more effectively integrated within 
established areas of research such as cluster theory, regional innovation systems, 
entrepreneurship, investment, and firm growth. 
• The specific issue of the selection of incubator business models appropriate in 
different and changing contexts is a potentially important area. Linking the activities of 
business incubation to new ventures in emerging industries presents particular 
challenges for both business model selection and integration with other actors in the 
regional innovation system. 
• The re-emergence of start-up accelerators is helping ensure that consumer Internet 
and mobile application-based start-ups receive the support they need to grow their 
businesses.  However the provision of incubation services for device-based or other 
physical product-based start-ups is a quite different, under-researched area but 
important area. Incubators of this second type will likely require heavier capital 
expenditure (for instance in specialist scientific of manufacturing/prototyping 
equipment) than do internet incubators. 
The research that underpinned this review was stimulated in part by the high levels of interest 
in business incubation as a tool for regional economic development.  In ending this review, it is 
perhaps useful to reflect upon comments made on the effectiveness of another policy tool that 
also sought to drive growth by fostering innovation – and which has features in common with 
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incubation – i.e. regional venture capital funds.  What was recently written of these funds may 
also be said of incubation: 
“Public sector venture capital is unable to create entrepreneurial regions and 
[…] a regionally-based model of public sector venture capital is ineffective 
because it lacks scale. A new approach for venture capital-deficient regions is 
therefore required which gives greater emphasis to the demand-side […]. The 
key policy question is whether public sector venture capital is an effective 
means of achieving regional development. Emerging evidence is not 
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6 Appendix B – Review of quantitative academic contributions 
AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY FOCUS (INCUBATOR OR FIRMS) TIME PERIOD HYPOTHESES/QUESTIONS RESULTS COMMENTS 
Rothaermel, 
Thursby 2005 USA 
Single incubator 
study including 79 
firms 
1998 TO 2003 
That a university link (IP or a link to faculty) will 
decrease the likelihood of new venture failure 
but will also retard graduation from an 
incubator. 
p. 1083 "... We find that a venture founded 
explicitly to commercialise a technology of the 
incubator-sponsoring university is significantly 
less likely to experience outright failure ... 
However we fail to find support for the 
hypothesis off retarded graduation ..." 
Not a direct piece of work looking at the 
performance of incubators per se, rather 
looking at whether having links to a university 
which sponsors an incubator has impacts. 
Unclear whether the impacts are long term 
positive, and also difficult to generalise from 
one incubator study. 
Aerts et al 2007 European Union 
Screening practices 
of European 
incubators based on 
a survey of 107 
incubators 
2003 
Are screening practices of incubators linked to 
tenant performance, measured as company 
failure? 
Built a screening index using three part model 
from Lumpkin and Ireland (1988) - financial, 
team, market and scored it as a Herfindal index 
from 0 to 1. Order of importance is market, 
team, then financial for the respondents. P.263 
"...shows a significantly positive relationship 
between tenant failure rate and the S index. 
This means a high concentration on one 
screening dimension ... is related to a higher 
failure rate." 
Much of the article is descriptive with this 
analysis piece in the middle. Not a very large 
sample (as data loss takes the N to 95 or lower 
in most models). 
Chen 2009 Taiwan 122 new ventures Not stated 
Broad study attempting to capture various 
impacts on new venture performance of which 
incubators is one. Two relevant hypotheses - 
Incubator support positively moderates the 
effect of market scope on the performance of 
new ventures, and incubator support negatively 
moderates the effect of technology breadth 
and commercialisation speed on the 
performance of new ventures 
p.99 "... Both incubator and venture capital 
supports do not have direct effect on ..." new 
venture performance. 
While other measures are based on 7 point 
Likert scales, the incubator support construct is 
a categorical variable with two values - 1 for a 
venture that has incubator support and 0 if not. 
This is a very rough measure and cannot unpick 
differences between incubators. 
Schwartz, 
Hornych 2010 Germany 
150 firms located in 
26 German BIs 2008 
Compares the impact of specialised versus non-
specialised incubators to test the levels of 
interaction in the incubator and the likelihood 
of  academic linkages 
p.489 "The results do not support the 
presumption that specialisation strategies are 
conducive to incubator-internal networking." 
p.489 Specialised business incubator (SBI) firms 
tend to have more academic-industry linkages 
compared to diversified business incubator 
(DBI) firms. 
The regression analysis has low explained 
variance and so this paper does not appear to 
provide significant input on whether incubators 
should be specialised or diversified. 
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TIME PERIOD HYPOTHESES/QUESTIONS RESULTS COMMENTS 
Scillitoe, 
Chakrabarti 2010 Finland, USA 
Firm level 
perspective 
based on a web 
survey of 42 
companies, 28 
US and 14 
Finnish 
2003 - 2004 
The main hypothesis is that higher rates of 
contact between the incubator management 
and incubatees improves the quality of the 
business and technical support provided, 
specifically the learning of buyer preferences 
and improving technical know how. 
Overall, stronger more frequent counselling 
contact improves incubatee learning of buyer 
preferences, whereas technical know how is 
increased through networking rather than 
through counselling. 
Very narrow in its scope of internal effects on 
companies in two very specific ways. 
Lindelof, 
Lofsten 2002 Sweden 
Comparison of 




are 273 firms 
on park and 300 
off park in the 
sample 
1999 
Tested a number of hypotheses, looking for 
differences between the on-park and off-park 
NTBFs including sales, employment, 
profitability and growth 
p.147 "Differences between firms in the two 
groups (on and off park) are apparent with 
regard to state sales (turnovers) and 
employment (number of employees). There 
was no significant difference with regard to 
profitability." p.150 "NTBFs in the off-park 
sample have a significantly lower growth of 
employment and a lower growth of sales 
turnover." 
Not clear whether the differences are 
attributable to higher rates of advanced 
degrees in on-park firms, or the extra 
management support provided. 
Dettwiler et 





and 300 off 
park 
1999 Investigates whether facilities management on and off park is important 
Results are mainly comparative, i.e. Not 
statistical, but show different rankings for items 
such as proximity to universities for the 
samples 
This paper reuses the sample from the 2002 
Lindelof and Hofsten paper, but does not 
appear to move that analysis significantly 
forward 











The paper attempts to assess the 'value-added 
contributions' of university technology business 
incubators, where value added refers to the 
specific ways that an incubator enhances the 
ability of its tenants to survive and grow 
See table 2 for summary of value added 
contributions. Further tables provide 
descriptive statistics on frequency of use and 
importance to tenants. Overall, it appears the 
tenant firms find the UTBI environment to be 
positive 
The analysis is mostly descriptive and so cannot 
provide more guidance than indicating that 
multiple services are positive to university 
incubated firms. 





Performance model developed for assessing 
incubators based on performance, 
management policies, and services and their 
value added 
Provides a framework for assessing incubators, 





7 Appendix C – Reference points for incubator business models 
Gaps in the table reflect that fact that not all studies examined the same performance measures. While this table is useful as a reference point, it is 
also important to recognise the range of values in many categories in addition to average values, as a key finding is that incubators can vary 
significantly. 
 EC 2000   
Setting Up and Operating Incubators 
(Inputs) 
Average Range  NBIA 2002 NBIA 2006 EBN-BIC 
2009 
UKBI 
Average capital investment cost €3.7 million €1.5 to €22 million     These categories were not 
the focus of this study. 



















Proportion of revenue from public 
subsidies 
37% 0% to 100% Incubators whose primary 
sponsor is either a non-
profit economic 
development organization 
or government agency 
31% 52%  
(just 8% had no 
sponsoring entity) 
57% 
Incubator space (average) 3,000 m² 90m² - 41,000m²  4,366 m² 3,437 m²  
(range 149-19,974 m²) 
3,159 m² 
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Incubator Functions (Processes) Average Range Incubator Functions 
(Processes) 
NBIA 2002 NBIA 2006 EBN-BIC 
2009 
UKBI 
Incubator occupancy rates 85% 9 –100%  75% 76% (range 72-88%) 78%  
Average length of tenancy 35 months 6 months – no 
maximum  
 35 months 33 months 36 months  
 Combined hours per week 
all paid incubation 
programme staff worked 
(MEDIAN) 
55 58   
Number of management staff 2.3 managers  1 – 5 managers  2.4 FTE 1.8 FTE  7.9 
Ratio of incubator staff: tenants 1: 14  1:2 – 1:64       
Proportion of management time advising 
clients 
39% 5 – 80%     24% (range 10-60%) 
 Number of outside service 
providers that regularly 
assisted clients 





 Number of incubators 
that take equity in 
tenants 
24% 24% (10% in all tenants, 
14% in selected 
tenants) 
  
Evaluating Services and Impacts 
(Outcomes) 
Average Range      
Number of incubator tenants 24.7 firms 1-120 firms  22 25 30  
Survival rates of tenant firms 85% 65 – 100%    90%  
Average growth in tenant firm turnover 20% p.a. (2001) 5% to 100% p.a.     58% 
 Incubators reporting at 
least one anchor tenant 
 29% (average of 3 per 
incubator) 
  
Job creation – average jobs per tenant 
company 
6.2 jobs per firm 1 to 120    ~5  
Job creation – new graduate jobs per 
incubator per year 
41 jobs per 
incubator 
7 to 197     14.3 FTE per tenant over 
incubation period 
Cost per job (gross) €4,400 €124 to €29,602    €10,839   
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